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When granting credit, banks depend on reliable information about the creditworthi-
ness and risk structure of potential borrowers. This information is typically gathered 
by national credit bureaus. Nationally established banks depend on information from 
credit bureaus more than ever, particularly when entering a foreign market. This DIW 
study (which is partially based upon research by the same authors for the European 
Credit Research Institute and data collected by the institute) investigates whether the 
existence of credit bureaus influences European bank competition and concludes that 
they facilitate market entry for foreign banks. In turn, the absence of credit bureaus 
can create significant disadvantages in competition. In this case, a market entry is 
then primarily possible via the purchase of an incumbent bank, because the entering 
institution has essentially no other opportunity to access debtor data. This study also 
shows that provision of data within the EU is not harmonized overall.
Credit bureaus collect and sell information on the creditworthiness of private indi-
viduals und companies. This information plays a decisive role in granting credit. 
Identification and payment information on debtors is typically reported by banks to 
credit registers, which then evaluate the data using statistical estimation procedures 
(rating and scoring models). When customers apply for credit or for an increase of a 
credit line, banks request customer profiles at one or more credit registers to evaluate 
creditworthiness. A loan is then priced according to this estimated creditworthiness 
or the bank may request additional collateral.1
This report examines the influence of credit registers on European bank competi-
tion. So far, credit information systems within the EU have not been harmonized. 
Virtually no international data traffic among private credit bureaus exists with 
regards to data on private individuals. However, because efforts are being made to 
create a level playing field across national borders in banking competition, we will 
first focus on the existing systematic differences between individual EU member 
states. Based upon this overview, we elaborate on how the establishment of credit 
registers affects European bank competition. For this matter, a new data set was 
1   The activity of credit registers has been the subject of great controversy in the German media, most recently in 
conjunction with the amendment to the Federal Data Protection Act. While the data protection law aspect of credit 
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created at the European Credit Research Institute 
that maps national bank competition from 1990 to 
2007. 
Credit bureaus in the EU vary from 
country to country
The credit registers in the EU member states are 
not harmonized. As stated, there is currently no 
international data traffic is in place, particularly 
among private credit bureaus. Due to the purpose of 
establishing similar conditions for bank competition 
across Europe, it is worthwhile to examine more 
closely the institutional differences that exist in the 
individual member states.
The variety of European institutions is particularly 
reflected in the organization and regulation of credit 
registers. For example, public credit registers only 
exist in 14 of the 27 member states.2 They are part 
of the central banks and serve different purposes, 
e.g., monitoring of systemic risks, monitoring of 
individual banks, and statistical purposes. The re-
porting participants are financial institutions that are 
licensed by the relevant central bank. The informa-
tion stored on borrowers by public credit registers 
varies as well from country to country (Table 1).
Unlike public credit registers, private credit bu-
reaus are, in most countries, institutions to which 
banks can report debtor data voluntarily. In some 
EU states, companies outside of the financial sector 
also report information, because they bear a pay-
ment risk.3
Additional differences between EU states arise 
from the variance in the reporting thresholds, that 
is whether and what level of total indebtedness is 
reported at what minimum threshold. The data re-
tention periods and type of data reported differ as 
well across countries. Data protection laws define 
which data may be reported and collected in each 
country. One fundamental distinction to be made 
here is positive and negative data.4 Negative data 
refers to information on payment problems, while 
positive data shows that borrowers regularly paid 
off their debt in compliance with the contract. Both 
data types are risk data, although only problematic 
borrowers are stored in negative credit registers.
The different development of credit registers within 
the EU countries is a result of the differences in 
economic development in the countries (for ex-
ample, the German credit register Evidenzzentrale 
für Millionenkredite was founded in 1934, during 
the Great Depression). Cultural and legal differ-
ences have influenced the different developments 
as well.
European Commission: obstacles exist 
in the access to credit information 
At the European level, there is an increased dis-
cussion about the influence of credit registers on 
2    These member states are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
3   European Commission (DG Internal Market and Services): Report 
of the Expert Group of Credit Histories. May 2009, ec.europa.eu/inter-
nal_market/consultations/docs/2009/credit_histories/egch_report_
en.pdf.
4   In countries such as France, Denmark and Finland, only negative 
data is collected by credit bureaus. The public credit registers in Italy, 
Latvia and Lithuania collect positive and negative data, whereas only 
positive data is reported in Germany and Austria.
Table 1
Credit registers in EU countries
Public credit registers Private credit bureaus
Negative data Positive data Negative data Positive data
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes1 Yes Yes
Bulgaria Yes – – Yes – –
Denmark No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes No
Germany Yes No1 Yes1 Yes Yes Yes
Estonia No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Finland No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes No
France Yes Yes No Yes1 Yes Yes
Greece No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Ireland No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latvia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Luxembourg No Does not exist Does not exist Yes – –
Malta    No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes No
The Netherlands No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Austria Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Poland No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Portugal    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Romania Yes – – Yes Yes Yes
Sweden No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Czech Republic Yes Yes1 Yes1 Yes Yes Yes
Hungary No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes No
Cyprus No Does not exist Does not exist Yes Yes Yes
1   Only companies.
Sources: European Commission (DG Internal Market and Services) 
and central bank of Slovakia. DIW Berlin 2010
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European bank competition. Credit registers are 
regulated by the European Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) and the Consumer Credit Directive 
(2008/48/EC).5 National data protection laws, bank 
laws and central bank laws are also relevant for 
credit reporting. The European Consumer Credit 
Directive requires  member states to guarantee that 
lenders from other member states have access to 
credit information databases under the same condi-
tions as incumbent banks in the country. However, 
the European Commission stated in a report that the 
basic principle of non-discriminatory and reciprocal 
access to credit registers is not yet fully operational 
and that significant obstacles are in place for cross-
border data transfers.6 In its report, the Commission 
summarizes the aspects which are particularly criti-
cal with regard to credit registers. Thus, the follow-
ing aspects are important:
the activity a company must conduct to  •	
be allowed to report clients to the credit 
register
whether a bank license is required and na- •	
tional presence (domestic residence) ne-
cessary for access permission
whether and how reciprocity is required in  •	
data reporting and data withdrawal
the application of data protection law  •	
which access conditions are required (for  •	
example, fees, membership)
 
Although the Commission recognizes that some of 
these conditions are justified, it also maintains that 
some could potentially restrict access. As an exam-
ple for such potential restriction, the Commission 
lists the condition set by the public credit registers 
of Austria, Spain, Portugal and Latvia that finan-
cial institutions must have a banking license and 
a national presence. Another recent development 
is the decision by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in 20067 which clarifies the conditions under 
which an exchange of creditworthiness data among 
competitors does not constitute an infringement of 
EU competition law. The Supreme Court of Spain 
(Tribunal Supremo) transferred the decision to the 
European Court of Justice to seek a clarification on 
5    Directive  2008/48/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of April 23, 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repea-
ling Council Directive 87/102/EEC.
6   Report on the retail banking sector inquiry - Commission Staff Wor-
king Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
– Sector Inquiry under Art 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on retail banking 
(Final Report) [COM(2007) 33 final].
7   Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of November 23, 2006. As-
nef-Equifax, Servicios de Informacion sobre Solvencia y Credito, SL v Aso-
ciacion de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc). Case C-238/05, 
European Court Reports, 2006, I-11125.
the matter with regard to the Spanish credit informa-
tion system. The ECJ established that the Spanish 
system is in principle acceptable, if relevant markets 
are not highly concentrated, the system does not 
allow identification of other participants, and the 
access conditions are non-discriminatory. The Court 
also established that reducing the uncertainty of bor-
rower credit risk actually encourages competition. 
Furthermore, the ECJ ordered the national courts to 
determine, if the conditions for an exception under 
Art. 81 (3) EC are given and that for such an ex-
emption the advantages and disadvantages of these 
types of arrangements needed to be balanced. So far 
no robust scientific findings have been available on 
the following questions:
whether and how the creation of credit in- •	
formation systems affects European bank 
competition
whether there are differences between pu- •	
blic and private systems and whether they 
imply a difference for cross-border market 
entries
whether it makes a difference if a credit  •	
register distributes positive and negative 
data on debtors, or only negative data
 
A new data set delivers findings on 
EU market entries from banks
Based upon economic theory, it is known that in-
formation on the potential risk of a debtor improves 
the transparency of credit granting. For example, 
information on the repayment history reduces infor-
mation asymmetries, decreases moral hazard as well 
as credit rationing. Contractual externalities play a 
special role in this context: a debtor can incur debts 
at several institutions and thereby put the repayment 
of all the debtor’s contracts at risk, if there is the 
threat of over-indebtedness.8 Therefore, it is in the 
interest of lenders to gain knowledge about pre-
existing credit contracts and the size of a borrower’s 
total indebtedness.
Expanding on this point, the European Credit 
Research  Institute  together  with  DIW  Berlin, 
University of Rome (Tor Vergata) and Graduate 
School Human Behaviour in Social and Economic 
Change (GSBC) in Jena has created a new database.9 
The database allows the analysis of the interaction 
of credit information systems and market entries 
8   Bennardo, A., Pagano, M., Piccolo, S.: Multiple-Bank Lending, Credi-
tor Rights and Information Sharing. CSEF Working Papers 211, February 
2009.
9   The data collection was financed by ECRI. Work on this data base, 
however, was also conducted at DIW Berlin and GSBC Jena.162
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We have combined the historical data on European 
credit information systems with bank competition 
data. For this data, cross-border market entries from 
banks via merger and acquisition as well the annual 
change in the number of opened branches of foreign 
credit institutes in member states were of interest.11 
Both variables were examined individually as well 
as merged (as proportion of branch entries in total 
European market entries).
We differentiated between the concentration and 
intensity of bank competition in the national banking 
markets and measured both with different indicators. 
Concentration in the banking market was measured 
using the market share of the three largest banks 
(concentration ratio 3, CR3). Return on assets, re-
turn on equity and net interest margins were used 
to measure intensity of competition.
In order to consider the influence of other factors on 
market entries, we have also prepared time series on 
various other national indicators, including the GDP 
per capita, inflation, legal origin of law, outstanding 
credit volumes measured as a percentage of GDP, 
and economic freedom existing in a country.12 The 
special feature of our data set is that it allows, for 
the first time, robust conclusions about the connec-
tion between market entries by banks and credit 
information systems.
In order to analyze this, we have grouped the coun-
tries according to where a public or private credit 
register was founded between 1990 and 2007 (this 
is the so-called reform group, referred to as Group 
1 below). We have combined countries in which 
no credit register was founded into a second group 
(control group, referred to as Group 2 below). The 
effect that the establishment of a credit register has 
on the selection of the market entry mode by banks 
can now be measured by comparing the average of 
the first group before and after the establishment 
with the averages of the second group: This is done 
by subtracting the Group 2 average from the Group 
1 average (difference-in-difference analysis).13
11  Source: National authorities and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
12  Sources were: IWF, Djankov et al. 2007, World Bank and Heritage 
Foundation.
13  The groups may also be sorted based upon other indicators, such 
as high or low market concentration. The strength of this method is that 
it is not a simple comparison of averages of the dependent variable (i.e. 
market entries) before and after the creation of a credit register. Rather, 
all changes that occurred in both groups at the same time (and which 
are not connected to the creation of a credit register) are deducted by 
subtracting the average of the control group from the reform group.
by foreign banks into national markets. The dat 
set maps national bank competition using different 
measures for competition, including the return on 
assets and net interest margin. The database is based 
on time series from 1990 to 2007, which tracks the 
creation and development of credit registers in the 
27 EU member states. We have compiled them to-
gether with entries by European credit institutions 
into other EU markets through merger and acquisi-
tion or the opening of new branch offices.
Credit registers influence bank 
competition
The data provides information on when a public or 
private credit register was founded between 1990 
and 2007 and whether positive or negative data on 
private individuals and companies are collected in a 
country. An index was generated to reflect the data 
collection on private individuals and companies in 
the statistical analysis.10 We have also collected data 
on the number and founding of the largest credit 
bureaus in the EU, as an indicator for the maturity of 
the market for credit information. The largest credit 
bureaus are market leaders in the field of risk infor-
mation. In Germany, this includes companies such as 
Schufa Holding AG, Bürgel and Creditreform.
10  When data is collected on private individuals or companies, the in-
dex is 1; if both are available, the index is 2. This data was indexed for 
both private and public credit register.
Table 2
Decrease in market concentration (CR3) due to the 
introduction of a credit register
Public credit register Private credit bureau
Before  After 
Difference
Before  After 
Difference
the introduction the introduction
Reform group1 0.76 0.65 –0.11*** 0.77 0.74 –0.03
Control group I2 0.69 0.70 0.01 0.69 0.71 0.02*
Difference –0.07*** –0.05 –0.12*** 0.08** 0.03*** –0.05
Reform group1 0.76 0.65 –0.11*** 0.77 0.74 –0.03
Control group II3 0.72 0.73 0.01 0.69 0.71 0.02
Difference 0.04** –0.08 –0.12*** 0.08** 0.06** –0.05
1   Countries that introduced a private or public credit register between 1990 and 2007.
2   EU 27 countries without establishment of credit registers.
3   New member state countries without establishment of credit registers.
Statistical significance with probabilities of error of 10%=*, 5%=**, 1%=***.
Sources: European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services, central 
bank of Slovakia, ECRI and DIW Berlin calculations. DIW Berlin 2010
The introduction of a public credit register decreases market concentration by eleven 
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Credit bureaus reduce the 
concentration in the banking market
As Table 2 shows, the difference in market con-
centration, before and after the introduction of a 
public credit register is statistically significant: CR3 
decreases by an average of eleven percentage points. 
The concentration has not significantly changed in 
markets, where no credit register was introduced 
during the same period. The differences between the 
groups indicate that a public credit register reduces 
the CR3 on average. The introduction of a second 
large credit bureau, however, reduces the concentra-
tion only to a smaller degree.14 One reason for this 
may be that private credit bureaus are a voluntary 
risk analysis instruments and may therefore have 
weaker effects in general.
An additional control group (control group 2), which 
only contains the new members of the EU, was 
created to incorporate differences that may have 
resulted from countries joining the EU. The results, 
however, remain robust.
Table 3 shows (separately for public registers and 
private credit bureaus) how the establishment of 
a credit register affects market entries. Additional 
sorting according to  concentration ratios permits 
an association with the assumption of the European 
Court of Justice that credit information systems in 
14  The market entry of the second largest credit bureau was incorpora-
ted into the univariate analysis for technical reasons, particularly in order 
to guarantee sufficient variation in this variable.
markets with low concentrations should be unob-
jectionable.
The results show the robust influence of the estab-
lishment of a credit register on cross-border market 
entries in Europe. The proportion of market entries 
by branching as a proportion of total cross-border 
entries by banks, serves as the independent variable. 
The proportion of branch entries increases after the 
introduction of a public register in countries with 
low degrees of market concentration. The difference 
between both country groups is statistically signifi-
cant (24 percentage points on average).
Estimations that incorporate mergers and acquisi-
tions as well as branching individually in the analy-
sis turn out somewhat weaker, but confirm the as-
sumption that the establishment of credit registers 
facilitates cross-border market entries in Europe, 
particularly, if subsidiaries are founded.
Other statistical procedures confirm 
the results as well
By using multivariate estimation procedures, we 
included additional variables in the analysis, which 
could have an influence on cross-border market 
entries in Europe. This includes variables such as 
inflation, GDP per capita, the legal origin of com-
mercial law and the ratio of domestic credit provid-
ed  by the banking sector over GDP. We have used 
various indicators of cross-border market entries as 
independent variables: merger and acquisitions, the 
Table 3
Increase in the share of branch entries (in total cross-border entries)1 due to the 
introduction of a credit register
Public credit register Private credit bureau
Before  After 
Difference
Before  After 
Difference
the introduction the introduction
EU 27
Low concentration2 0.18 0.3 0.12** 0.16 0.25 0.09
High concentration2 0.46 0.34 –0.12** 0.51 0.4 –0.11
Difference –0.28*** –0.04 0.24*** –0.35*** –0.15*** 0.20*
New member states
Low concentration2 0.14 0.25 0.11* 0.1 0.3 0.20***
High concentration2 0.44 0.3 –0.14** 0.75 0.43 –0.32
Difference –0.30*** –0.05 0.25* –0.65 –0.13** 0.52**
1 Proportion of market entries resulting from the founding of branch offices in relation to total market entries.
2 The three largest banks have a market share more than 60 percent.
Statistical significance with probabilities of error of 10%=*, 5%=**, 1%=***.
Sources: European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services, central bank of Slovakia, ECRI and DIW Berlin calculations. DIW Berlin 2010
The introduction of credit registers increases the share of market entry through branches by more than 20 percentage 
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change in the number of branch entries into a market and the proportion of branches 
in the total cross-border entries.
The independent variables are the information indexes (positive and negative in-
formation) as well as net interest margin, which serves as a competition indicator.15 
These procedures confirm the positive effect of credit registers on market entries via 
branching. Furthermore, they also confirm the influence different types of informa-
tion (positive and negative) have on cross-border market entry modes. The collection 
of both types of data, positive and negative, increases cross-border entries.
Conclusion
The activity and effect of credit information systems that collect and distribute 
data on private borrowers is typically considered from two perspectives: the per-
spective of credit market development and the perspective of data protection. The 
main questions related to these two perspectives are the scope of data collections 
on natural and legal persons and for what purposes they should be distributed. This 
report adds a third perspective: it shows that credit registers influence cross-border 
market entry modes of foreign banks by facilitating such entry within the EU. 
This effect is generated independent from credit market development in a country, 
inflation rates, economic development or legal origin of commercial law. From 
the perspective of competition, therefore, the activity of credit registers shows a 
positive contribution.
Thus, countries that want to strengthen European bank competition should consider 
the establishment of a public credit register at their central bank. These types of 
institutions currently exist in 14 of the 27 EU member states. Public credit regis-
ters are also important from the perspective of financial market stability and risk 
monitoring.
Private credit bureaus, in turn, have weaker effects on bank competition. This could   
be a sign that national regulatory authorities should focus more on the scope and 
quality of data collections. During the course of our investigation, we encountered 
a series of problems associated with the data collection on private credit bureaus. 
It is generally difficult to obtain detailed information on their activity, for example. 
In order to provide researchers and the public with better information on these 
institutions, regulatory authorities ought to require greater disclosure about their 
activities in future.
More research is required on how credit information systems can be harmonized 
and whether such an effort is worthwhile. Europe still has a long path ahead to 
harmonize these systems.
15  Various estimation procedures were used based on the dependent variable, including Poisson regression, Tobit 
regression and fixed effect models.